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Article
Attribution and the Umbrella Clause – Is there a
Way out of the Deadlock?
Dr. Michael Feit, LL.M.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investors frequently contract with entities entrusted with a
role previously fulfilled by the host state.1 This is particularly true of
utility and infrastructure industries, such as the production and
distribution of energy (hydroelectric power, oil, gas, and coal), posts and
telecommunications, transportation (railway, airports, and airlines), and
financial services.2 While these entities are typically state-owned or
otherwise closely affiliated with the state, they often possess a separate
legal personality.3 For ease of reference, these entities will be referred to
as “state-owned entities” (SOE).
If an investor believes that a SOE is not complying with its
contractual obligations, then the investor may bring a claim against the
host state under the applicable bilateral or multilateral investment treaty
*Dr. Michael Feit is an associate with Walder Wyss (Zurich) and specializes in
international arbitration and litigation. Prior to joining the firm, Dr. Feit was a senior
associate in the international arbitration practice group of a major law firm in London. Dr.
Michael Feit graduated from the University of Zurich both as licentiatus iuris (magna cum
laude; J.D. equivalent) and doctor iuris (summa cum laude; received award for outstanding
performances in business law) and from New York University School of Law (LLM;
Dean’s Graduate Award Scholar). Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the
views of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of Walder Wyss.
1. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 198 (2008); Paul Michael Blyschak, Arbitrating Overseas Oil and Gas
Disputes: Breaches of Contract Versus Breaches of Treaty, 27 J. INT’L ARB. 579, 610, 618
(2010); Barton Legum, Are States Liable for the Conduct of Their Instrumentalities?: Case
Law of Tribunals Other Than ICC and ICSID, in STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 57, 63 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Jennifer Younan eds., 2008); Srilal M.
Perera, State Responsibility—Ascertaining the Liability of States in Foreign Investment
Disputes, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 499, 500 (2005); Thomas W. Wälde, Energy
Charter Treaty-Based Investment Arbitration: Controversial Issues, 5 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 373, 396 (2004).
2. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 34 (2005); OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 9 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Wälde, supra note 1, at 396.
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invoking, inter alia, the breach of the so-called “umbrella clause”.4 The
umbrella clause is a regular feature of investment treaties and calls for
host states to observe contractual obligations entered into by SOEs.5 For
this type of claim to be successful two preconditions must be met.6 First,
4. See, e.g., Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award,
¶ 68 (Oct. 12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf; DOLZER & SCHREUER,
supra note 1, at 161 et seq. (2008); Blyschak, supra note 1, at 591–92, 596; Kaj Hobér,
State Responsibility and Attribution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 575 et seq. (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
5. For a typical version of a contemporary umbrella clause, see Energy Charter
Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, 109 (“Each Contracting Party shall
observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor
of any other Contracting Party.”). See generally OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella
Clause in Investment Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 101–34 (2008).
6. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc A/RES/56/83 [hereinafter Articles of Responsibility] (Dec. 12,
2001) which reads: “There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct
consisting of an action or omission: (a) [i]s attributable to the State under international
law; and (b) [c]onstitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.” See also
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 68, U.N. Doc A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in Rep. of the Int’l
Law Comm’n, 53d sess, Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles] (“Article 2 specifies the conditions required to establish the
existence of an internationally wrongful act of the State, i.e. the constituent elements of
such an act. Two elements are identified. First, the conduct in question must be attributable
to the State under international law. Secondly, for responsibility to attach to the act of the
State, the conduct must constitute a breach of an international legal obligation in force for
that State at that time.”); see also, EDF (Serv.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/13,
Award,
¶¶
213–14
(Oct.
8,
2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/EDFAwardandDissent.pdf (“In the Tribunal’s view, such
conduct, including the subsequent bringing to an end of the contract arrangements and the
institution of a system of auctions in their place, was clearly designed to achieve a
particular result within the meaning of the Commentary to Article 8 of the ILC Articles.
As such, this conduct was attributable to Romania. The question, remains whether the acts
and conduct that, according to the Tribunal’s determination were attributable to Romania,
were in violation of the BIT, as alleged by Claimant. Claimant has summarized as follows
the BIT breaches it alleges were committed by Romania: ‘. . . The BIT between Romania
and the UK contains . . . Romania’s obligation to observe its contractual agreements . . .
.These alleged breaches will be examined in turn.’”) (quoting Reply for Complainant, ¶
377); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/04/19,
Award,
¶
318
(Aug.
18,
2008),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showD
oc&docId=DC1611_En&caseId=C44. Regarding the preconditions of a state’s
responsibility for the conduct of its instrumentalities, see generally Peter Tomka, Are
States Liable for the Conduct of Their Instrumentalities?—Introductory Remarks, in
STATE ENTITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 8–9 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Jennifer
Younan eds., 2008). Even though addressing violations of international law other than
breach of the umbrella clause, a diligent discussion of attribution can be found in Bayindir
Insaat Turizm Ticaret VE Sanay A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29,
Award,
¶
113
(Aug.
26,
2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/Bayandiraward.pdf.
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the breach of contract must be attributable to the state.7 Second, the
breach of contract must amount to a violation of the umbrella clause.8
Tribunals apply different legal standards to both requirements causing the
same case to be decided differently depending on the constitution of the
tribunal.9 As one commentator correctly notes, “[i]nvestors looking for
consistency in pursuing claims and states contemplating new BITs have
been placed in a quandary.”10
This article deals with the hotly debated first precondition of the
state’s responsibility under the umbrella clause. Tribunals are split over
the question of whether or not a breach of contract can be attributed to
the state by applying the Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles).11 When this question is
answered is answered in the affirmative tribunals move on to decide
whether the respective breach amounts to a violation of the umbrella
clause.12 When, however, the question is answered in the negative, no
further analysis is typically conducted because the state cannot be held
responsible for conduct that cannot be attributed to it.13
7. See Articles of Responsibility, supra note 6, Annex, art. 2; see also EDF, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶ 213; Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, ¶ 68; Nykomb
Synergetics Tech. Holding AB v. Latvia, Case No. 118/2003, Award, § 4.2 (Arb. Inst. of
the Stockholm Comm. 2003), http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/InvestorState_Disputes/Nykomb.pdf; Nick Gallus, An Umbrella Just for Two? BIT Obligations
Observance Clauses and the Parties to a Contract, 24 ARB. INT’L 157, 165 (2008).
8. See, Articles of Responsibility, supra note 6, Annex, art. 2; see also EDF, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶ 213; Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, ¶ 68; Nykomb,
Case No. 118/2003, § 4.3; Gallus, supra note 7, at 165.
9. For a recent overview of the divergent constructions of the umbrella clause by
ICSID tribunals, see Jonathan B. Potts, Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization, 51 VA. J. INT’L
L. 1005 (2011); see also Duke Energy, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, ¶ 319–20;
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION—A COMMENTARY 236 (2d ed.
2009) (“The exact meaning and effect of umbrella clauses has been the subject of much
debate and disagreement in arbitral practice.”).
10. Potts, supra note 9, at 1030–31.
11. See Blyschak, supra note 1, at 611 (“To what degree this is possible, and under
what circumstances, is a very uncertain area of law. Investment arbitration tribunal’s
decisions on this point conflict, as do academic commentaries.”).
12. See, e.g., Gustav F.W. Hamester GmbH & Co. KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/07/24,
Award,
¶
313
(June
18,
2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (“Naturally, if an act is
considered attributable to the State, the Tribunal must then determine whether such an act
is illegal and entails the international responsibility of the State . . . . If the Tribunal finds
that an act is not attributable to the State, this should be the end of the matter.”); see also
EDF, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶¶ 213–14; Nykomb, Case No. 118/2003, ¶¶ 4.2–4.3.
13. See AMTO LLC v. Ukraine, Case No. 080/2005 (ECT), Final Award, ¶¶ 101,
107–8,
110
(Arb.
Inst.
of
the
Stockholm
Comm.
2008),
http://www.italaw.com/documents/AmtoAward.pdf (holding that the conduct of the stateowned entity could not be attributed to the state and therefore concluding that the umbrella
clause had no direct application to this case); see also Hamester, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24, ¶ 313 (“If the Tribunal finds that an act is not attributable to the State, this
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This article does not aim to contribute further arguments to one side
or the other of this dispute. Rather, it intends to examine whether the
existing case law is really as contradictory as it appears or whether it can
be reconciled by taking the underlying motives of the tribunals into
account.14 As will be shown, the controversy in some of the more highprofile cases only seemingly revolved around the question of the
applicability of the ILC Articles and could have been avoided in the first
place. Awareness that the real issue at stake may not necessarily be
attribution under the ILC Articles can provide a way out of deadlock in
some instances.
II. A RECENT EXAMPLE OF SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTING
CASE LAW: HAMESTER AND KARDASSOPOULOS
A recent example of seemingly contradictory case law is Hamester
v. Ghana15 and Kardassopoulos v. Georgia.16 In Hamester, the tribunal
held the joint-venture agreement (JVA) entered into by the Ghana Cocoa
Board (Cocobod), a SOE, could not be attributed to Ghana by relying on
the ILC Articles.17 Therefore, Ghana could not be held responsible for
any breach of the JVA under the umbrella clause.18 In contrast, the
tribunal in Kardassopoulos, concluded that contractual commitments
entered into by two SOEs, SakNavtobi and Transneft, could be attributed
to Georgia by applying the ILC Articles.19
In Hamester, a request for arbitration was submitted against Ghana
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) on the basis of the BIT between Germany and Ghana.20 The
claimant argued that Cocobod breached the JVA on the processing of
cocoa beans and asserted that these breaches were attributable to
Ghana.21 According to the claimant, the breaches of the JVA were
elevated to breaches of the BIT through the umbrella clause in Article
should be the end of the matter.”).
14. Such analysis appears to have first been conducted by Jean-Christophe Honlet
and Gullaume Borg. See Jean-Christophe Honlet & Guillaume Borg, The Decision of the
ICSID Ad Hoc Committee in CMS v. Argentina Regarding the Conditions of Application
of an Umbrella Clause: SGS v. Philippines Revisited, 7 L. & PRAC. INT’L CT. &
TRIBUNALS 1, 24–28 (2008) (examining contradictory decisions of tribunals and
concluding “there may not be such a different approach . . . .”). The present article intends
to further develop their theory.
15. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24.
16. See Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and
ARB/07/15,
Award
(Mar.
3,
2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/KardassopoulosAward.pdf.
17. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶¶ 342–50.
18. Id.
19. See Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, ¶¶ 273–80.
20. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶ 1.
21. Id. ¶ 7.
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9(2)22 of the BIT.23 Ghana countered that the umbrella clause would not
cover contractual obligations, and even if it did, it could only apply to
contracts entered into by Ghana, not SOEs with a separate legal
personality.24
The tribunal conducted an in-depth analysis as to whether
Cocobod’s conduct could be attributed to Ghana under the ILC Articles
and concluded that the preconditions of Articles 4, 5 or 8 of the ILC
Articles were not met.25 The tribunal explained that once it was decided
that the act complained of was not attributable to the state, there was no
need to determine whether this conduct was in breach of an international
obligation of the state.26 Nevertheless, in light of the parties’ detailed
submissions, the tribunal decided to expand its analysis based on the
assumption that the acts were—contrary to the tribunal’s conclusion—
attributable to Ghana.27
The tribunal therefore assessed whether the acts in question
amounted to a breach of international law. In construing the breach of the
umbrella clause, the tribunal first acknowledged that there were divergent
decisions on the interpretation of the umbrella clause, “including the
approach to the international law rules of attribution in this context.”28
The tribunal quickly made clear that it shared the view that contracts
concluded between the investor and legal entities separate from the state
would not fall within the scope of the umbrella clause.29 The tribunal
pointed out that the JVA was signed by the claimant and Cocobod, not by
Ghana, and provided three reasons for its conclusion.30
First, pursuant to the wording of the umbrella clause, the contractual
obligations that the claimant sought to impose on Ghana were not
22. The umbrella clause provided: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any other
obligation it has assumed with regard to its investments in its territory by nationals or
companies of the other Contracting Party.” Treaty between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Republic of Ghana for the encouragement and reciprocal protection of
investments, Ger.-Ghana, art. 9(2), Feb. 24, 1995, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dit
e/iia/docs/bits/germany_ghana.gr.pdf.
23. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶¶ 1, 70, 75, 148–62.
24. Id. ¶¶ 83, 340 (citing Respondent’s Counter-Memorial, ¶ 311).
25. Id. ¶¶ 182–285. Articles 4, 5, and 8 of the ILC Articles each set forth a basis for
attribution to the state. Article 4 refers to state organs, article 5 to conduct of persons or
entities exercising elements of governmental authority, and article 8 to conduct directed or
controlled by the state. See Gallus, supra note 7, at 165.
26. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶ 313.
27. See id.
28. See id. ¶ 343.
29. See id. The Tribunal cited with approval Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 223 (Apr. 22, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 245 (2007)
(“[C]ontracts concluded between an investor and a legal entity separate from the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan did not fall within the scope of the umbrella clause.”).
30. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, ¶ 347.
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“assumed by it.”31 “Given that the umbrella clause in this BIT is
specifically delimited by reference to obligations that have been
“assumed by the State,” the tribunal saw no basis to ignore these words,
and to extend the ambit of the provision to contractual obligations
assumed by other separate entities.”32
Second, given the wording of Article 9(2), the tribunal concluded
that the contracting states, Germany and Ghana, did not intend to
“transform the nature, extent and governing law of domestic law
contractual obligations concluded by separate entities.”33
Third, the tribunal explained that it was “aware that some tribunals
extended the ambit of ‘umbrella clauses’ to contracts concluded by
separate entities, by reference to the international law principles of
attribution.”34 The tribunal held: “even if the international law principles
of attribution are applicable in construing the ambit of Article 9(2) of the
BIT here, it was clear that Cocobod’s act of concluding the JVA was not
attributable” to Ghana under the ILC Articles.35
The tribunal explained that in these circumstances, the contractual
commitments of Cocobod, being a separate entity from the state, could
not be considered as elevated by Article 9(2), into treaty commitments of
the state itself.36 Thus a violation committed by Cocobod could not
constitute a violation of the BIT.37
In Kardassopoulos, the tribunal favored another approach.
Kardassopoulos was an ICSID arbitration brought under the Energy
Charter Treaty and the BITs between Georgia and Greece and Georgia
and Israel, dealing with an investment in the development of oil
pipelines.38 In this case, the tribunal did not have to assess the breach of
the umbrella clause, but it dealt in another context with the question of
whether Georgia was bound by the contractual commitments of two
SOEs, SakNavtobi and Transneft.39
Georgia rejected claims of unlawful expropriation and breach of the
fair and equitable treatment standard by arguing it was not responsible
for the contractual commitments of SakNavtobi and Transneft.40 The
tribunal held that Georgia was bound by the contractual commitments of
31. See id. ¶ 347i.
32. See id.
33. See id. ¶ 347ii.
34. See id. ¶ 347iii.
35. See Hamester, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24.
36. See id. ¶ 348.
37. See id.
38. See Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and
ARB/07/15, Award, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Kardassopoulo
sAward.pdf.
39. The claimants abandoned this claim in their Reply. See id. ¶ 212.
40. See id. ¶ 272.
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SakNavtobi and Transneft by way of attribution pursuant to the ILC
Articles.41 Further, the conduct of SakNavtobi and Transneft could be
attributed to Georgia under Articles 4, 5 and 11 of the ILC Articles, an
opposite conclusion from Hamester.42 It noted that “[w]hen considered
together, the representation by SakNavtobi and Transneft and the various
espousals by the Georgian Government of the JVA and the Deed of
Concession are conclusive”43 and concluded that “for the purpose of
determining a breach of the applicable treaties, any acts or omissions of
SakNavtobi and/or Transneft constituting such breach may be attributed
to the Respondent.”44
These recent awards reflect the conflicting views on the question of
attribution. While the tribunal in Hamester denied that contractual
undertakings could be attributed to the state under the ILC Articles, the
tribunal in Kardassopoulos concluded otherwise. These resulting
discrepancies between tribunals fail to provide adequate guidance on how
to assess attribution by similarly acting SOEs.
III. THE QUESTION IN DISPUTE: CAN CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS BE ATTRIBUTED UNDER THE ILC ARTICLES?
Hamester and Kardassopoulos are just two recent examples of an
ongoing dispute. Tribunals and commentators alike are split over the
question of whether the legal undertaking assumed by the SOE can be
attributed to the state under the ILC Articles.45 Only if the contractual
obligations are attributable to the state, it is argued, can the subsequent
breach be meaningfully attributed:
It must be noted that there are two points in time at which rules of attribution are
important in applying obligations observance clauses to sub-state entity
obligations. As with a claim for breach of any international obligation, rules of
attribution can be applied to the act breaching the obligation. However,
determining that the act breaching the obligation is attributable to the state is not
the end of the matter. The act breaching the obligation is meaningless if the
obligation is not that of the state. . . .It is the application of international rules of
attribution at this first point in time – to determine the obligations of the state –
which appears to have divided BIT tribunals.46
41. See id. ¶ 274 (“In the Tribunal’s opinion, there can be no real question in these
arbitrations as to the attribution of any acts or omissions on the part of SakNavtobi or
Transneft to the Respondent. The Tribunal invoked Article 7 of the Articles on State
Responsibility in its Decision on Jurisdiction, but Articles 4, 5 and 11 are equally
applicable here.”).
42. See id. ¶¶ 274–80.
43. See id. ¶ 279.
44. See id. ¶ 280.
45. See Gallus, supra note 7, at 166 (“The key difference in the reasoning of the two
sets of decisions reaching conflicting conclusions on the attribution of sub-state entity
contracts seems to be the role of international law rules of attribution, as reflected in the
ILC Articles.”); see also Blyschak, supra note 1, at 612–13.
46. Gallus, supra note 7, at 166; see also Blyschak, supra note 1, at 610–11.
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Some tribunals and legal writers reject the idea that legal
undertakings assumed by the SOE are attributable to the state under the
ILC Articles. They take the stance that the ILC Articles are not general
rules of attribution and cannot be used to attribute conduct, which does
not constitute a breach of an international obligation. This position is
supported by the commentary to the ILC Articles as adopted by the ILC
in 2001 (Commentary) which explains that “[t]he question of attribution
of conduct to the State for the purposes of responsibility is to be
distinguished from other international law processes by which particular
organs are authorized to enter into commitments on behalf of the State”47
and clarifies that “[s]uch rules have nothing to do with attribution for the
purposes of State responsibility.”48 The Commentary continues: “the
State’s responsibility is engaged by conduct incompatible with its
international obligations”49 and makes clear that “[t]hus, the rules
concerning attribution set out in this chapter are formulated for this
particular purpose, and not for other purposes for which it may be
necessary to define the State or its Government.”50
Early comments during the drafting stage of the ILC Articles lend
further support to the argument that these provisions were not intended to
serve as general rules of attribution. A report from 1973 explains that:
[a]ttaching to the State a manifestation of will which is valid, for example, in
order to establish its participation in a treaty is, however, in no way identifiable
with the operation which consists of attributing to the State particular conduct
for the purpose of imputing to it an internationally wrongful act entailing
international responsibility.51

The report continues to point out the narrow meaning of the
envisioned ILC Articles by arguing that:
[i]t would be wrong to adopt the same criteria in these two cases and to propose
an identical solution based on a general and common definition of ‘act of the
State’. In the context of the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful
acts, the ‘act of the State’ has its own specific character and must be defined
according to particular criteria.52

In line with these comments, Malcolm D. Evans also underlines the
difference between rules of representation on the one hand and
attribution under the ILC Articles on the other. He explains that “[t]he
rules of attribution specify the actors whose conduct may engage the
responsibility of the State, generally or in specific circumstances”53
47. See Draft Articles, supra note 6, at 39.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. Documents of the Twenty-Fifth Session Including the Report of the Commission
to the General Assembly, [1973] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 189, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1973/Add.1.
52. Id.
53. See James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International
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whereas he emphasizes that “[i]t should be stressed that the issue here is
one of responsibility for conduct allegedly in breach of existing
international obligations of the State”54 and “does not concern the
question which officials can enter into those obligations in the first
place.”55
A clear stance against the attribution of legal undertakings by
applying the ILC Articles is taken by Richard Happ:
Contrary to a recently voiced opinion, it is not possible to attribute a contract
concluded by a sub-division or state-entity to the state by using the rules on state
responsibility. The rules of attribution have been developed in the context of
attributing acts to the state in order to determine whether those acts are in breach
of international law. They cannot be applied mutatis mutandis. A clear
distinction exists between the responsibility of a state for the conduct of an entity
that violates international law (e.g. a breach of treaty) and the responsibility of a
State for the conduct of an entity that breaches a municipal law contract.56

Other tribunals and commentators, however, attach a different
meaning to the ILC Articles. They understand the ILC Articles to
constitute general rules of attribution under which both wrongful and
non-wrongful acts can be attributed to the state. While Andrew
Newcombe and Lluís Paradell acknowledge that “[i]t may be argued that
these rules have been developed in the context of attributing
responsibility for international law breaches and are not transposable to
attributing the undertaking (the contract), i.e., the legal obligation, to the
state”57 they counter that “the language and approach of the ILC’s
Articles on State Responsibility and commentaries seem to suggest that
they refer to attribution of conduct generally.”58
Thomas W. Wälde also shares the view that, as a general matter,
contractual undertakings can be attributed to the state, explaining that
“[i]f a State enterprise . . . has entered into a contract, and if this contract,
or rather contractual relationship, can be attributed, from entry to the end,
to the State, then the State has entered into a commitment and is obliged
to respect it.”59
That the ILC Articles, or at least Article 4, constitute general rules
of attribution and were therefore also applicable to conduct that would
not constitute a wrongful act was upheld in Siag v. Egypt. The tribunal
expressly followed the claimant’s argument that “Article 4 was a general
Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 451, 460 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Richard Happ, The Nykomb Case in the Light of Recent ICSID Jurisprudence, in
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 324 (Clarisse Ribeiro
ed., 2006).
57. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES, STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 461 n.133 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2009).
58. See id.
59. Wälde, supra note 1, at 397.
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principle of international law, which was not limited to the wrongful acts
of a state organ”60 and therefore concluded that “the non-wrongful acts of
Egypt’s judiciary are the acts of the Egyptian State.”61
Kaj Hobér explains that if the ILC Articles are not applied to
attribute contractual undertakings, “it would seem that this would allow
states to do precisely what the rules of state responsibility were intended
to prevent, namely to avoid responsibility by delegating responsibilities,
to allow states to ‘contract out’ of state responsibility.”62
As this collection of authorities shows, two camps exist whose
views appear irreconcilable. If the ILC Articles are regarded as general
rules of attribution, both the legal undertaking assumed by the SOE and
its subsequent breach will be attributed to the host state if the
preconditions of Articles 4, 5 or 8 of the ILC Articles are met.63 If the
ILC Articles are only applied to conduct that potentially constitutes a
breach of an international obligation, the legal undertaking is not
attributable. As explained above, it is generally considered that the
breach of contract alone cannot be meaningfully attributed because only
a party to a contract can commit a breach.64
IV. IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE DEADLOCK?
Honlet and Borg suggest that the discrepancy between the two
camps “may be more apparent than real.”65 Based on an analysis of
Eureko v. Poland66 and Noble Ventures v. Romania67, the authors
conclude that despite appearances, the states were held to be obliged by
the legal undertaking because at the conclusion of the contract, they were

60. See Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, ¶ 194
(June
1,
2009),
http://italaw.com/documents/WaguihElieGeorgeSiagAwardandDissentingOpinion_001.pdf.
61. See id. ¶¶ 194–95 (The tribunal based its argument on a comment by Dolzer &
Schreuer to Article 7 of the ILC Articles: “The Tribunal prefers the arguments of the
Claimants on this issue. In taking that view, the Tribunal notes the provisions of Article 7
of the ILC Articles, which states that: ‘The conduct of an organ of a State…shall be
considered an act of the State under international law . . . even if it exceeds its authority’
[emphasis added]. Dolzer and Schreuer state that under Article 4 of the ILC Articles,
‘[a]cts of a state's organs will be attributed to that state even if they are contrary to law…’
[emphasis added]. The clear corollary of that statement is that acts of a State's organs that
are not contrary to law or in excess of authority will be applied a fortiori to the State.”)
(citations omitted).
62. Hobér, supra note 4, at 575.
63. See Gallus, supra note 7, at 165.
64. See id. at 166.
65. See Honlet & Borg, supra note 14, at 24 (footnote omitted).
66. See Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion
(Rajski), (Aug. 19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 331 (2007).
67. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, (Oct.
12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf.

ATTRIBUTION AND THE UMBRELLA CLAUSE

31

represented by the state treasury and a SOE, respectively.68 Thus, they
explain, the states were considered to be responsible because of ab initio
representation rather than post hoc attribution.69
Honlet and Borg rightly suggest that when examining the apparently
contradictory case law, it is worthwhile to look beyond the surface and to
switch the focus from the apparent decisive point, namely attribution, to
the potentially actual point, namely the parties to the contract. In several
instances the role played by the state at the conclusion of the contract
appeared to be a decisive factor when tribunals assessed the question of
whether or not the contractual obligation entered into by the SOE could
be attributed to the state.
It is possible to reconsider Kardassopoulos and examine the
tribunal’s considerations in light of Honlet and Borg’s observations. In its
award, the tribunal repeatedly emphasized the involvement of the
government of Georgia in the negotiations:
The assurances given to Claimant regarding the validity of the JVA and the
Concession were endorsed by the Government itself, and some of the most
senior Government officials of Georgia (including, inter alia, President
Gamsakhurdia, President Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Sigua and Prime
Minister Gugushvili) were closely involved in the negotiation of the JVA and the
Concession. The Tribunal also notes that the Concession was signed and
“ratified” by the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, an organ of the Republic of
Georgia.70
....
The reasoning in Southern Pacific Properties is apposite to this case in many
respects. Thus, even if the JVA and the Concession were entered into in breach
of Georgian law, the fact remains that these two agreements were ‘cloaked with
the mantle of Governmental authority’. Claimant had every reason to believe
that these agreements were in accordance with Georgian law, not only because
they were entered into by Georgian State-owned entities, but also because their
content was approved by Georgian Government officials without objection as to
their legality on the part of Georgia for many years thereafter.71

While the tribunal formally based its argument that Georgia was
bound by the contracts concluded by the state entities on the ILC
Articles, these passages suggest that the tribunal was influenced in its
decision to hold the host state responsible by the host state’s strong
involvement in the conclusion of the agreements. The tribunal argued
that the agreements were “cloaked with the mantle of Governmental
authority”;72 this can be construed to mean that the SOEs acted on behalf
of Georgia, or that Georgia entered into the agreement as an additional
68. See Honlet & Borg, supra note 14, at 27.
69. See id.
70. Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB
07/15,
Award,
¶
273
(Mar.
3,
2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/KardassopoulosAward.pdf (emphasis added).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See id.
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party.
In EnCana v. Ecuador, the considerations provided by the tribunal
also suggest that its finding of attribution was based on the contractual
undertakings assumed by the SOE Petroecuador to Ecuador because of
the state’s involvement during the conclusion and performance of the
contract.73 It is interesting to note in this context that the domestic law of
Ecuador defined agreements of the type concluded as “entered into by the
State, through PETROECUADOR”.74 When dealing with the question of
whether Ecuador was responsible for the obligations entered into by the
SOE, the tribunal did not expressly, however, base its conclusion on the
argument that Ecuador was represented by Petroecuador but rather relied
on Article 5 and 8 of the ILC Articles.
In Noble Ventures, representation rather than attribution was even
more manifestly the actual reason for considering the state bound by the
obligations assumed by the SOE. When assessing whether the conduct of
the entities SOF and APAPS could be attributed to Romania under
Article 5 of the ILC Articles,75 the tribunal reviewed the statutory bases
under Romanian law of these entities and concluded that they were
authorized to act on behalf of the state:
Consequently, the Tribunal concludes that SOF and APAPS were entitled by law
to represent the Respondent and did so in all of their actions as well as
omissions. The acts allegedly in violation of the BIT are therefore attributable to
the Respondent for the purposes of assessment under the BIT. 76
....
Both SOF and APAPS were responsible, as a matter of Romanian law, for the
transfer of publicly owned assets to private investors. Both entities were clearly
charged with representing the Respondent in the process of privatizing Stateowned companies and, for that purpose, entering into privatization agreements

73. See EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award, ¶
154 (Feb. 3, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/EncanaAwardEnglish.pdf (“The
Respondent did not deny that entering into Participation Contracts with foreign companies
to exploit the natural resources of Ecuador, the conduct of Petroecuador as a State-owned
and State-controlled instrumentality is attributable to Ecuador for the purposes of the BIT.
In this respect it is relevant that Petroecuador was, in common with the SRI, subject to
instructions from the President and others, and that the Attorney-General pursuant to the
law had and exercised authority ‘to supervise the performance of . . . contracts and to
propose or adopt for this purpose the judicial actions necessary for the defence of the
national assets and public interest’. According to the evidence this power extended to
supervision and control of Petroecuador’s performance of the participation contracts and to
their potential renegotiation. Thus the conduct of Petroecuador in entering into, performing
and renegotiating the participation contracts (or declining to do so) is attributable to
Ecuador. It does not matter for this purpose whether this result flows from the principle
stated in Article 5 of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts or that stated in Article 8. The result is the same.”) (footnotes omitted).
74. See id. ¶ 26 (citation omitted).
75. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 70
(Oct. 12, 2005), http://italaw.com/documents/Noble.pdf.
76. Id. ¶ 80 (emphasis added).
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and related contracts on behalf of the Respondent. Therefore, this Tribunal
cannot do otherwise than conclude that the respective contracts, in particular the
SPA, were concluded on behalf of the Respondent and are therefore attributable
to the Respondent for the purposes of Art. II(2)(c)BIT.77

The tribunal expressly held that these entities represented Romania
in the negotiations and concluded the contract on behalf of the state.
The tribunal in LESI-Dipenta v. Algeria relied on a similar argument
when explaining that the contract concluded with a separate legal entity
may be attributed to the state where the state was at least indirectly
involved in the contract negotiation and exercised influence over the
entity.78
In contrast, tribunals that argued that the contractual undertaking
could not be attributed to the state emphasized the distinction between
the entity concluding the agreement and the state. In Hamester, the
tribunal explained:
The JVA was signed by Hamester and Cocobod, with no implication of the ROG
[Republic of Ghana]. The ROG was not named as a party, and did not sign the
contract. There has been no suggestion that the ROG was intended to be a party
thereto (and indeed there may well have been reasons why it was not a party
thereto).79

The tribunal stressed that Ghana was by no means involved in the
conclusion of the contract. Therefore, the tribunal expressed its belief
that Ghana did not cause the claimant to believe that Ghana intended to
become a party to this agreement. Thus, even under the assumption that
the SOE’s conduct could be attributed to Ghana,80 the tribunal refused to
consider Ghana bound by the contract because it was clear under the
circumstances that Ghana did not intend to become a party.
In Nagel v. Czech Republic,81 the claimant inter alia argued that the
Czech Republic breached the umbrella clause contained in the BIT
between the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic because of the
failure of a SOE to meet its obligation to involve the claimant in any
telecommunications license awarded to the entity.82 The tribunal rejected
this claim on the grounds that the contract was entered into by the SOE
and not the Czech Republic:

77. Id. ¶ 86 (emphasis added).
78. See Consorzio Groupement LESI-DIPENTA v. People’s Democratic Republic of
Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, Award, § II, ¶ 19 (ii) (Jan. 10, 2005), 15 ICSID Rep.
3 (2010).
79. Gustav F.W. Hamester GmbH & Co. KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/24,
Award,
¶
347
(June
18,
2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/Hamesterv.GhanaAward.pdf (emphasis added).
80. See id. ¶ 313.
81. See Nagel v. Czech Republic, Case No. 49/2002, Award, (Arb. Inst. of the
Stockholm
Comm.
2003),
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Nagel_v_CzechRep_Award.pdf.
82. See id. ¶¶ 72–76, 91.
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While Sra—subsequently succeeded by CRa—was a party to the Cooperation
Agreement, the Czech Republic was not. Although Sra was a fully owned State
enterprise, it was a separate legal person whose legal undertakings did not as
such engage the responsibility of the Czech Republic.
....
The Arbitral Tribunal notes that Mr Nagel’s accounts of frequent and close
contacts with persons on the Government side differ a great deal from Mr
Dyba’s and Mr Sedlacek’s statements that they were neither involved in nor
informed about Mr Nagel’s and Millicom’s action and plans in the Czech
Republic. However, the Arbitral Tribunal does not find it necessary, for the
purpose of this case, to go into details in this regard but finds it sufficient to note
that, in any event, there is no convincing evidence of such concrete Government
involvement in connection with the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement as
would make the Czech Republic responsible for the implementation of the
Agreement. Moreover, as explained to the Arbitral Tribunal, Government
approval or any other binding commitment by the Government would have had
to be made in a form which was certainly not applied in this case, and Mr Nagel
cannot have been justified in believing that, as a result of the Cooperation
Agreement, the Government had made any commitment or undertaken any legal
obligations towards him.83

This analysis provides particular insight if contrasted with the
involvement of the Georgian government in Kardassopoulos. As noted,
in Kardassopoulos the tribunal pointed out that “[t]he assurances given to
Claimant regarding the validity of the JVA and the Concession were
endorsed by the Government itself”84 and that “some of the most senior
Government officials of Georgia . . . were closely involved in the
negotiation of the JVA and the Concession.”85 Considering these
differences, it is not surprising that the tribunals arrived at opposite
conclusions as to the question of whether the host state was bound by the
contract.
Finally, some tribunals emphasize the parties that are involved at the
close of contract negotiations. While Impregilo v. Pakistan86 did not
address the investor’s justifiable expectations in such clear terms as was
the case in Nagel, the lack of such expectation can be read into the
tribunal’s repeated emphasis that the relevant “[c]ontracts were
concluded with WAPDA and not with the State of Pakistan”87 and that
“the [c]ontracts at issue were concluded between the Claimant and
WAPDA”.88
In the cited cases, the extent to which the host state was involved in
83. Id. ¶ 321, 324 (emphasis added).
84. See Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and
ARB
07/15,
Decision
on
Jurisdiction,
¶
191
(July
6,
2007),
http://italaw.com/documents/Kardassopoulos_000.pdf (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, (Apr. 22, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 245 (2007).
87. See id. ¶¶ 198, 216.
88. See id. ¶ 216.
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the negotiations appears to have played a decisive role in the tribunal’s
examination of whether or not the legal undertaking in question could be
attributed to the state. However, it would be more convincing to take into
account the state’s involvement in the negotiations at an earlier stage,
namely when the parties to the agreement are determined. If the state’s
participation in the conclusion of the agreement leads to the result that
the state has become a party to the contract and assumed the obligations
subsequently breached, attribution is no longer required and thus there is
no need to engage in the discussion of whether the ILC Articles can be
used to attribute legal undertakings.
Two scenarios can be distinguished when assessing whether the
state has become a party to the agreement. First, the involvement of the
state causes the investor to reasonably and in good faith believe that the
SOE represented the state at the conclusion of the agreement. In this
case, the state, and not the SOE, has become the obligor of the
contractual duties. Because the SOE acts as a representative of the state
when performing the contract, the state is responsible for any subsequent
breach under the umbrella clause based on principles of agency and not
attribution. Second, the involvement of the state causes the investor to
reasonably and in good faith believe that the state intended to become a
party to the agreement along with the SOE. In this case, it must be
determined which obligations have been assumed by the state. If the state
was heavily involved in the negotiation phase, as was apparently the case
in Kardassopoulos,89 it can be argued that the investor could reasonably
understand that the state jointly and severally assumed the same
obligations as the SOE.90 In such a case, the failure to perform by the
SOE would also constitute a failure of the state, and no attribution would
be required. Only if an analysis of the parties’ intent shows that the state
did not assume the subsequently breached obligation, does the question
arise whether this legal undertaking can be attributed to the state based
on the ILC Articles.
The question of whether the state has become a party to the contract
can be assessed by applying general principles of law.91 Whether the
SOE negotiated “cloaked with the mantle of Governmental authority”
can be determined by applying the doctrine of apparent authority as
formulated in several transnational codifications, such as Article 14(2) of
the Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods,92 Article
89. See id. ¶ 273.
90. See id. ¶ 280 (“For the purpose of determining a breach of the applicable treaties,
any acts or omissions of SakNavtobi and/or Transneft constituting such breach may be
attributed to the Respondent.”).
91. For the relevance of general principles of law in investment arbitration, see
generally Tarcisio Gazzini, General Principles of Law in the Field of Foreign Investment,
10 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 103, 103–19 (2009).
92. See Convention on Agency in the International Sale of Goods art. 14 ¶ 2, Feb. 17,
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2.2.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts 2010,93 and Article 3:201 of the Principles of European
Contract Law.94 All these provisions share the same underlying idea: The
principal shall be bound by an agreement entered into by the agent and
the third party if the principal’s conduct causes the third party reasonably
and in good faith to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf
of the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that
authority.95
Whether the state by its involvement expressed its intention to
become a party along with the SOE can also be assessed by applying the
principle of implied consent as formulated in Article 2.1.1 of the of the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 201096 or
Article 2:102 of the Principles of European Contract Law.97 These
provisions appear to reflect a generally acknowledged principle, as noted
by Gary B. Born “[m]ost legal systems recognize that a party’s assent to
contractual terms may be established by conduct.”98
Inspiration can also be taken from the discussion on commercial
arbitration regarding the legal bases for subjecting non-signatories to the
arbitration agreement. When addressing the question of which legal
principle the joinder of “less-than-obvious parties” shall be determined,
William W. Park explains:
1983, 22 I.L.M. 249 (“Nevertheless, where the conduct of the principal causes the third
party reasonably and in good faith to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf of
the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal
may not invoke against the third party the lack of authority of the agent.”).
93. See UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 82
(Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private L., 2d ed. 2010) (“However, where the principal
causes the third party reasonably to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf of
the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal
may not invoke against the third party the lack of authority of the agent.”).
94. See THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II, at 201 (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds., 2000) (“A person
is to be treated as having granted authority to an apparent agent if the person’s statements
or conduct induce the third party reasonably and in good faith to believe that the apparent
agent has been granted authority for the act performed by it.”).
95. See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
VOLUME I 1150 (2009) (“There are few principled grounds for choosing among these
options, providing the basis for a substantial argument that, where international
commercial contracts are concerned, a specialized rule of international law governing
apparent authority should apply.”).
96. See UNIDROIT, supra note 93, at 34 (“A contract may be concluded either by
the acceptance of an offer or by conduct of the parties that is sufficient to show
agreement.”).
97. See THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 94, at 143 (“The
intention of a party to be legally bound by contract is to be determined from the party's
statements or conduct as they were reasonably understood by the other party.”).
98. See BORN, supra note 95, at 666 (containing numerous references); see also id. at
1150.
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Arbitral jurisdiction based on implied consent involves a non-signatory that
should reasonably expect to be bound by (or benefit from) an arbitration
agreement signed by someone else, perhaps a related party. In such
circumstances, no unfairness results when arbitration rights and duties are
inferred from behaviour.
....
Implied consent focuses on the parties’ true intentions. Building on assumptions
that permeate most contract law, joinder extends the basic paradigm of mutual
assent to situations in which the agreement shows itself in behavior rather than
words.99

A related concept is the principle of deemed consent:
Properly understood, ‘deemed consent’ operates simply as a way to objectify
assent for fact patterns where an agreement exists, notwithstanding that
traditional formalities may be absent or unclear. The circumstances of the
parties’ relationship will be seen as ‘tantamount’ to an agreement (perhaps a
‘backdoor’ contract) even if the conduct does not fit squarely within the contours
of classic contract doctrine.100

Park notes, however, that this doctrine “should never replace clearminded analysis of who agreed to what.”101 Reliance on deemed consent
is only appropriate where “the parties’ reasonable expectations require
that arbitration be imposed by virtue of facts which in fairness must be
assimilated to consent.”102
Relying on non-domestic principles to determine the parties to an
agreement is not uncommon in commercial arbitration. Gary B. Born
observes that “[a] number of arbitral awards have applied principles of
international law to ascertain the parties to an international arbitration
agreement.”103
Obviously, the scope of the principle of implied or deemed consent
is not limited to a determination of the parties to an arbitration
agreement; rather, these principles are generally applicable to such a
determination.104
99. William W. Park, Non-Signatories and International Contracts: An Arbitrator’s
Dilemma, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 1.12
(Belinda McMahon ed., 2009); see also NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 2.52 (5th ed. 2009) (“As between the original parties
to the arbitration agreement, such consent may be either express, implied, or by reference
to a particular set of arbitration rules . . . .”); W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 177 (3d ed. 2000) (“The
addition as respondents of non-signatory parties, parent corporations, or members of a
group of companies, is justified only where there are special circumstances (including
participation in the performance of the contract) from which a contractual intention to
include them within the scope of the arbitration clause can be implied.”).
100. Park, supra note 99, ¶ 1.45.
101. See id.
102. See id. ¶ 1.47.
103. See BORN, supra note 95, at 1212 (containing numerous references).
104. See THE COMM’N ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, supra note 94, at 143;
UNIDROIT, supra note 93.
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Finally, it should be clarified that the purpose of this article is not to
provide yet another basis to hold host states responsible. Rather, by
assessing whether the state has become a party can be advantageous to
the state. For instance, if proper analysis shows that in light of all
relevant circumstances the investor could not have reasonably assumed
that the state had become a party, the risk is reduced that the tribunal will
take the state’s conduct inappropriately into account when dealing with
attribution. The involvement of the state during the negotiation phase
plays an incidental role under the ILC Articles, which focus chiefly on
the attribution of wrongful acts.105 The involvement of the state during
the negotiation phase plays an incidental role. It may primarily be of
relevance under Article 8 of the ILC Articles. If determination of the
parties to an agreement and attribution under the ILC Articles is strictly
separated, a more convincing result can be achieved.
V. CONCLUSION
Analysis shows that in some instances, the tribunal’s decision as to
whether a subsequently breached contractual undertaking can be
attributed to the host state appears to be influenced by the involvement of
the host state in the conclusion of the contract. However, such
involvement is already and primarily relevant when determining the
parties to the agreement. The state may be considered to be a party of the
agreement if its involvement caused the investor reasonably to believe
that it intended to become a party to the agreement. Such assessment
could be conducted based on the generally acknowledged principles of
apparent authority, implied consent or deemed consent.
If a proper assessment of the parties’ expectations at the conclusion
of the contract leads to the result that the state had become a party to the
agreement, the hotly debated question of whether contractual obligations
are attributable under the ILC Articles can be avoided. However, if an
examination shows that the investor could not have reasonably assumed
that the state has become a party, a focused analysis can be conducted as
to whether the preconditions of the ILC Articles are met. In such
assessment, the host state’s participation in the negotiations plays only an
incidental role.

105. See, e.g., Gallus, supra note 7, at 166 (illustrating that primarily international law
rules of attribution are traditionally applied to acts breaching an international law
obligation).

